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Smith: Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear: A New Standard

FUJITSU LTD. V. NETGEAR: A NEW STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, a plaintiff in a patent suit bears the burden of
showing literal infringement by a "comparison of the properly
interpreted claim limitations to the elements of the accused device"
or, in other words, by "apply[ing] the claims to the accused
device."' The Federal Circuit, however, recently held in Fujitsu
Ltd. v. Netgear that "if an accused product operates in accordance
with a standard, then comparing the claims to that standard is the
same as comparing the claims to the accused product." 2 The
holding in Fujitsu Ltd. appears to represent a clarification of the
law, indicating that the traditional approach is not the sole way to
prove infringement.
This clarification, although logical, seems to many to represent a
new method of proving infringement. In essence, a plaintiff is
now explicitly allowed to rely on an alleged infringer's admission
that they practice a standard (after a showing that the claims cover
every single implementation of the standard) instead of comparing
the claims to the alleged infringing product. This is often, at least
initially, an easier task than comparison to each product, as
plaintiffs can automatically claim infringement on any product that
adheres to the standard. Defendants only recourse is showing that
the claims do not cover the standard or that the products do not
practice the standard.
Part II of this article briefly describes the history and basics of
the Fujitsu Ltd. case. Part III examines the difference between the
methods of proving infringement prior to and after Fujitsu Ltd.
Part IV deals with the fear of a substantial shift in effort during
trial from patent holders to defendants as a result of the holding,
positing that the holding really represents a mere subtle shift which
is accompanied by judicial efficiency. Lastly, Part VI, suggests
1. Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
2. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed Cir. 2010).
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questions that are left to be answered in future cases.
II. HISTORY AND SUMMARY OF FUJITsuLTD. v. NETGEAR

The case was an appeal by Plaintiffs Fujitsu, Phillips, and LG
from the final holding in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin. The district court granted Defendant
Netgear's summary judgment motion for non-infringement of the
Plaintiffs' patents and denied the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for
summary judgment of infringement.3 The Plaintiffs had argued
that because Netgear claimed to practice a technical standard (the
IEEE 802.11 wireless standard), and because the patent allegedly
covered the standard, Netgear necessarily infringed on their
patents.4
The district court disagreed with the Plaintiffs'
inferential approach and held that the Plaintiffs must show
evidence of infringement for each accused product.5
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated:
We hold that a district court may rely on an
industry standard in analyzing infringement. If a
district court construes the claims and finds that the
reach of the claims includes any device that
practices a standard, then this can be sufficient for a
finding of infringement..

.

. [I]f an accused product

operates in accordance with a standard, then
comparing the claims to that standard is the same as
comparing the claims to the accused product. 6
The Federal Circuit, however, listed an exception, stating that
"in many instances, an industry standard does not provide the level
of specificity required to establish that practicing that standard
would always result in infringement. . . . In these cases, the patent
owner must compare the claims to the accused products . . . ." As

3. Id. at 1325.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1327.
7. Fujitsu Ltd., 620 F.3d at 1327-28.
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an escape route, "[a]n accused infringer is free to either prove that
the claims do not cover all implementations of the standard or to
prove that it does not practice the standard."4
The Federal Circuit relied on Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S.
Philips Corp.9 and Broadcom Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n.10 In
those cases, the plaintiffs asserted that alleged infringers'
compliance with a particular standard necessitated infringement of
their patents. Although the court found non-infringement in both
cases (because the claims did not cover the standard, or the
product did not adhere to the standard)," the Federal Circuit in
Fujitsu Ltd. viewed those cases as having opened the door to the
method of comparing the claims against the standard to find
infringement instead of the traditional comparison against the
accused product.12
The Federal Circuit claimed that public policy favors this
approach because, when a court determines that all
implementations of a standard infringe, judicial resources are
conserved by avoiding a separate analysis of every product that
undisputedly practices that standard.13 The Federal Circuit lastly
defended its holding generally, stating that the exceptions to the
rule "should alleviate any concern about the use of standard
compliance in assessing patent infringement."' 4
III. ANEW METHOD OF PROVING INFRINGEMENT

The general premise of the new method is that when a potential
infringer claims that a product adheres to a standard, the patent
holders are allowed to use that assertion as an admission that the
product does indeed operate within the literal bounds of the
standard. The patent holder then need only show that its claims
read on every implementation of the standard to prove

8. Id. at 1327.
9. 363 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
10. 542 F.3d 894 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
11. Broadcom, 542 F.3d at 899; Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1277.
12. Fujitsu Ltd., 620 F.3d at 1327.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1328.
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infringement. Standards are readily available to nearly anyone, and
because of this, plaintiffs are not required to serve vast production
requests and spend time sifting through mountains of data to make
their case that the product itself infringes the claims. The plaintiff
merely compares the claims to the standard and relies on the
defendant's admission do the rest.
At a minimum, the Fujitsu Ltd decision brought into the light a
method of proving infringement that was vastly underused or that
practitioners simply thought was unavailable to them. This was
the first time the Federal Circuit has explicitly outlined this general
method and its exceptions. In fact, most commentary and
practitioner blogs discussing the case have implied that this is a
new method, which makes it easier for patent holders to prove
infringement:
"[T]he decision provides patent owners with a fast
and easy way to prove infringement when industry
standards are involved."' 5

". . an admission that an accused infringing device

practices an industry standard may, without more,
be the basis for a finding of infringement."' 6

"[T]his groundbreaking decision. . .makes it easier
to prove patent infringement where the operation of
a product complies with an industry standard."' 7
The newly outlined method strays from past holdings that
explained the requirements for a plaintiff to prove patent
15. Steven Seidenberg, Court Says Netgear's Products Don't Infringe WiFi
Patents, InsideCounsel, Dec. 1, 2010, available at http://www.inside
counsel.com/Issues/20 10/December-20 10/Pages/Court-Says-Netgears-Products.aspx.
16. Patent Baristas, http://www.patentbaristas.com/ (Sept. 24, 2010).
17. Posting of Tom Tuytchaevers to Sunstein Intellectual Property Update,
http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/publications-news/news-letters/2010/11 /
Tuytschaevers_20101 1.html (Nov. 2010).
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infringement.' 8 In fact, some recent cases have expressly stated
that a comparison of the "[p]atent with the Standard Specifications
[is] a separate and distinct inquiry from that of comparing the
claims of the patent with the structural elements of the alleged
infringing [product]." 1 9 Others have allowed comparison to
standards to permit plaintiffs to survive defendants' summary
judgment motions (indicating that it establishes at least a question
of fact), but state that "comparison to the standard . .. might not be
sufficient to prove infringement at trial . .. " Still others have

stated "analysis of standards implemented by a product may be
relevant to infringement and provide support for the patentee's
position, provided that standards compliance does not replace the
ultimate legal standardfor infringement."2 1 This demonstrates a
strong judicial belief that simple comparison to a standard would
not be enough to prove infringement.
Even in the cases on which the Fujitsu Ltd. court relied, where
the courts analyzed standards compliance in response to the
plaintiffs' arguments that standards compliance necessitated
infringement, those courts primarily focused on the substantive
portions of the plaintiffs' arguments, ultimately finding that the
claims did not cover the standards. 22 However, those courts
merely glanced over the plaintiffs' initial propositions that
18. See Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) ("To prove infringement, the patentee must show that an accused
product embodies all limitations of the claim .... ) (internal cites omitted); see
also Amhil Enters. Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("Literal infringement of a claim exists when every limitation recited in the
claim is found in the accused device, i.e., when the properly construed claim
reads on the accuseddevice exactly.") (emphasis added).
19. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cinram Int'l Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 735,
741 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
20. Robert A. Matthews Jr., Accused Product Complies with Industry
Standard, 2 ANNOTATED PATENT DIG. § 12:25.50 (citing Rembrandt Data
Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC, 673 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Va. 2009)) (emphasis
added).
21. Id. (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 544 F. Supp. 2d 1080
(S.D. Cal. 2008)) (emphasis added).
22. See Broadcom Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 542 F.3d 894, 899 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); see also Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d
1263, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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comparison to the standard was a legitimate substitution for the
traditional comparison to the product in the first place.2 3
Additionally, those courts in no way affirmatively endorsed the
proposition that such a substitution would suffice in-and-of-itself
to prove infringement.24 Despite all of this, Futjitsu'snew method
is likely here to stay.
IV. FEARS AND REALITY OF THE NEW METHOD
In its amicus brief, the Association of Corporate Counsel
Intellectual Property Committee outlined many convincing
arguments against adopting the new method. These arguments
included, among other issues, fears that such a method would be
over-inclusive, would shift the burden from the plaintiff to prove
infringement to the defendant to disprove infringement, and would
harm judicial efficiency.25 The Fujitsu Ltd. opinion expressly
addressed at least two of these concerns, specifically stating that
the rule is more judicially efficient than analyzing every individual
product and that over-inclusiveness is avoided because "[o]nly in
the situation where a patent covers every possible implementation
of a standard will it be enough to prove infringement by showing
standard compliance." 26 The opinion, however, did not address
the burden shifting and chilling effects. Instead, the court made a
blanket statement that the exceptions to the rule "should alleviate
any concern about the use of standard compliance in assessing
patent infringement." 27
In terms of the two issues it expressly addressed, the court was
correct. First, product-by-product (or limitation-by-limitation)
analysis can be a tedious task, and being able to perform this task
by comparison to a standard to which the multiple products
undisputedly adhere to will absolutely result in efficiencies.

23. See Broadcom, 542 F.3d at 899; see also Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1277.
24. See Broadcom, 542 F.3d at 899; see also Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1277.
25. Brief for Association of Corporate Counsel Intellectual Property
Committee as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee at 5, 9, 15, Fujitsu Ltd. v.
Netgear, Inc., 620 F.3d 1321 (Fed Cir. 2010) (No. 2010-1045).
26. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear, Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed Cir. 2010)..
27. Id.
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Second, over-inclusiveness is avoided because, as stated above, the
accused infringer has the opportunity to "prove that the claims do
not cover all implementations of the standard or to prove that it
does not practice the standard."28 While it is true that in asserting
the second of those two defenses the defendant may evoke a
product-by-product comparison against the standard anyhow,
potentially undermining the efficiency benefits, it should be noted
that every case in which a comparison to a standard was conducted
(as cited by the parties and otherwise), defendants have been
successful in fending off infringement by utilizing one of these
two defenses. 29
In terms of the issues of burden shifting and judicial efficiency,
Fujitsu Ltd. 's new method does result in a subtle shift in the
burdens at trial from the plaintiff to the defendant. However, any
negative effects of this shift are vastly outweighed by other
realized benefits, including an efficiency boost, and are justifiable
in view of the quidpro quo involved in implementing a standard.
This is true largely because there are several reasons why an
accused device might not practice a standard, some less obvious
than others.
Many standards, though often articulating the
particulars to practice a standard, only require an interoperability
or performance test to verify compliance. 30 Other standards allow
self-certification.31
Thus, a manufacturer may implement a
standard and claim compliance, but may have implemented only
enough compliance with the standard to pass interoperability or
performance tests rather than complying with every minute
requirement outlined in the standard. Ultimately, there may (and
often do) exist multiple methods of achieving testable compliance
that do not literallycomply with the standard.
The assumption that a product that claims to be compliant with a
standard is literally compliant with each and every limitation of
28. Id. at 1327.
29. See id. at 1327-29; see also WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3COM Corp., No.
C 10-03448 WHA, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010);
Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cinram Int'l Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Broadcom, 542 F.3d at 899; Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1277.
30. Brief of Amicus Curiae Association for Appellee, supra note 25, at *8
n.3.
3 1. Id.
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that standard (beyond a compliance test) also runs against basic
patent law principles.
Innovation is to be rewarded and
encouraged, and the assumption of literalcompliance fails to take
into account the incentive to invent new and useful ways of
achieving an end goal. A technology firm may find a different or
better way to achieve interoperability that passes compliance tests
but performs an untested portion of a standard differently, thus not
literally adhering to the standard. Although standard setting
organizations may be extremely knowledgeable in their specific
areas, they do not have the omnipotent foresight to account for
every possible (or the best) application of the standard.3 2
Take, for example, a hypothetical standard for throwing a
fastball that, among its vast number of provisions, specifies that
the pitcher's arm must go over his head. This could be for any
number of reasons: maybe this was the only way the standard's
creators thought it was possible, or this point of specificity was
carelessly added during over-zealous standard drafting. Continue
this hypothetical by assuming the only compliance test is the speed
and accuracy of the pitch. Enter Dennis Eckersley, 33 a world
famous sidearm pitcher, who wants to get his fastball certified. He
passes the required compliance test (speed and accuracy) and is
certified "fastball compliant." Many consumers of baseball are
very pleased with his sidearm fastball and Dennis becomes very
successful. Later he is sued by someone holding the patent for an
arm going over the head during a pitch. If a pitcher where to
literally adhere to the standard, he would of course be infringing.
However, despite the fact that it passed the compliance test,
Dennis's side arm technique does not literally comply with every
provision of the standard, nor does it have to in order to maintain
He has found a workaround for a relatively
certification.
unnecessary provision of the standard, yet the patent holder is
given the benefit of the doubt and the burden shifts to Dennis to
show that he does not literally comply with the standard.
The devil is in the details, and it is the details of the relevant
32. See WiA V Networks, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2 (discussing Fujitsu Ltd.,
620 F.3d 1321).
33. Dennis Eckersley played professional baseball from 1975 to 1998 and
was elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2004.
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standard, be they truly necessary or simply an extraneous
provision or relic of past revisions, that could result in a false
finding of infringement. The truth is that these provisions are
often explicitly outlined in standards, but "[o]nly rarely, if ever, is
there a perfect correspondence between the abstract ideal spelled
out in the text of a technical standard and the real-world
implementations of the technology."34 In such situations, the onus
is on the defendant to show that it does not literally comply with
the standard, and thus does not infringe. The required effort
rightfully shifts as the plaintiff is granted this inference of literal
compliance by the prior admission. However, the shift is subtle
because the effort to show that an accused device does not literally
comply can easily succeed by simply explaining how the accused
device does in fact operate and how it is different from the
standard.
Even still, the benefits to judicial efficiency outweigh the
potential negative effect of the burden shift. In an instance such as
the hypothetical above, judicial efficiency may not be achieved if
the accused infringer presents evidence of non-compliance on a
product-by-product basis. However, this effort is now left to the
accused infringer, who has the knowledge of exactly how its
products operate and can present the most efficient and persuasive
argument for non-compliance. This would be preferred over
relying on the plaintiff to engage in costly and clumsy analysis of
every single potentially infringing product. All in all, as one
observer noted, "[t]he court's holding should help dramatically
reduce the time and cost required to litigate cases involving
standards-compliant accused products." 35
Additionally, although the burden is shifted, the shift is
equitable in relation to the accused infringer. Potential defendants
who operate in standard-dependant markets benefit in those
markets from those standards. Take, for example, a USB flash
drive manufacturer. The demand for these devices is high and any
late entrant to this market can still quickly make a profit. The
34. Brief of Amicus Curiae Association for Appellee, supra note 25, at *8.
35. Nutter, McClennen and Fish, L.L.P., Client Advisories and Reports, Nov.
16, 2010, http://www.nutter.com/publications-events.php?section= 13&Report
ID= 1146.
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manufacturer is not required to develop a new product and a new
market through which to sell that product. Rather, it can simply
put out a product complying with the USB standard and enter the
market with limited risk. Essentially, the manufacturer has
realized instant gains by adherence to the standard. As part of a
quid pro quo for the near-instant benefit of claiming conformance
or passing an interoperability test, a manufacturer should expect
that a court may rely on its admissions of compliance in a patent
infringement case.
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
At least two lines of questions exist with respect to the decision.
First, the finding of infringement relies on the alleged infringer's
admission of practicing the standard, but the infringer is allowed to
"prove [inter alia] that it does not practice the standard." 36 Does
the alleged infringer bear the burden of persuasion or a lesser
burden of production to refute the infringement? Is the court's
explicit reliance on the admission of practicing the standard such a
strong inference that it requires the alleged infringer to actually
prove it does not practice the standard? Or can the alleged
infringer simply make an evidentiary offering to refute the
admission inference? A lesser burden on the defendant to
overcome the inference may help protect the defendant against
disclosure of key innovative features if it is their intention to keep
those features secret. However, a lesser burden may allow Fujitsu
Ltd. 's exceptions to swallow its rule, resulting in defendants easily
slipping out from under infringement theories utilizing the new
method and thus forcing the more costly traditional method to
prove infringement.
In fact, since Fujitsu Ltd. was decided, only one court (in WiA V
Networks v. 3COM Corp.) has cited Fujitsu Ltd. on this issue,
citing it to show non-infringement. 37 The WiA V Networks court
heavily emphasized the exceptions to the general rule, reiterating:
[T]he Federal Circuit [in Fujitsu Ltd.] recognized
36. FujitsuLtd., 620 F.3d at 1327.
37. WiA VNetworks, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2.
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that mere compliance with an industry protocol
does not necessarily establish that all compliant
devices implement the protocol in the same way.
Different accused devices may achieve compliance
with an industry standard or protocol through
varying designs, with different tolerances, and with
competing features . . . .

Even if each of the

accused devices is compliant with the IEEE 802.11
wireless protocol, it is far from a foregone
conclusion that the asserted claims in WiAV's
patents will cover all implementations of the
protocol.3 8
By this, it seems the WiA V Networks court had less faith in the
general rule, and was more confident that the exceptions applied,
thus ultimately requiring a product-by-product analysis. 39 This
may be an indication of how Fujitsu Ltd. 's new method will be
analyzed in the future.
The second line of questions is even murkier. What constitutes
the admission in the first place? Is it mere advertising that a
product is compliant? Is it manuals or packaging? What language
is required for it to be an admission (i.e., "compliant," "adheres
to," "works with," etc.)? These questions need to be fleshed out
before the extent of the decision can be fully understood.
VI. CONCLUSION

At the very least, Fujitsu Ltd. should put companies that produce
products adhering to a standard on notice of the potential
implications of claiming adherence. Holders of standard-essential
patents can now initially bring alleged infringers into court with a
little more ease. This power shift may impact whether companies
choose to license these patents or not, or how companies choose to
advertise their products. It also may impact the value of standardessential patents, thus impacting future licensing. The overall
effect of the holding is yet to be determined, but it will be
38. Id.

39. Id.
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undeniably palpable.
In conclusion, Fujitsu Ltd. outlined a new method to prove
infringement, diverging from the traditional method of product-byproduct analysis. Ultimately, the new method represents a slight
shift in the effort required by each party, with a corresponding
shift in power to standard-essential patent holders, but this shift is
justifiable in view of the judicial efficiencies garnered by the
holding.
JoshuaP. Smith
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